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Emotional words are processed rapidly and automatically in the left hemisphere (LH) and
slowly, with the involvement of attention, in the right hemisphere (RH). This review aims to
find the reason for this difference and suggests that emotional words can be processed
superficially or deeply due to the involvement of the linguistic and imagery systems,
respectively. During superficial processing, emotional words likely make connections
only with semantically associated words in the LH. This part of the process is automatic
and may be sufficient for the purpose of language processing. Deep processing, in
contrast, seems to involve conceptual information and imagery of a word’s perceptual
and emotional properties using autobiographical memory contents. Imagery and the
involvement of autobiographical memory likely differentiate between emotional and
neutral word processing and explain the salient role of the RH in emotional word
processing. It is concluded that the level of emotional word processing in the RH should
be deeper than in the LH and, thus, it is conceivable that the slow mode of processing
adds certain qualities to the output.
Keywords: emotional words, meaning access, conceptual processing, disembodied/embodied, superficial/deep,
cerebral hemispheres
Introduction
This paper concerns emotional words and how these words are processed in the cerebral
hemispheres. Our previous review (Abbassi et al., 2011), based on behavioral, electrophysiological,
and neuroimaging research results, indicates that both hemispheres are involved in the processing
of emotional words, albeit in diﬀerent and probably complementary ways. Emotional words are
processed rapidly early in processing, and slowly with the involvement of attention later on; the left
hemisphere (LH) and the right hemisphere (RH) are likely responsible for this early vs. later stage
of processing, respectively1. Automatic processing does not place much demand on processing
resources whereas attentional processing is slow, eﬀortful, and under one’s active control. This
paper aims to pinpoint the nature of emotional word processing and ﬁnd the reason for the rapid
vs. slowmodes of processing. It shows that emotional word processing does not necessarily produce
1This statement about the role of the LH and RH in early and later stage of emotional word processing, respectively, does not
mean that processing occurs only in the LH or the RH. Instead, it implies that at these stages, the center of processing is in
the LH or RH: there is relatively stronger activation in these respective hemispheres.
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a subjective experience of emotions (though it may); thus,
a kind of superﬁcial processing is also possible and is
probably the reason for fast and automatic processing of these
words in the LH. Deep kind of processing, in contrast, is
likely the reason for slow processing of emotional words in
the RH.
By emotional word, we refer to any word characterized
by emotional connotations (e.g., “lonely,” “poverty,” “neglect,”
“bless,” “reward,” “elegant”) or denoting a speciﬁc emotional
reaction (e.g., “anger,” “happy,” “sadness“). Although emotional
words can convey the emotions we feel, they can be used
without subjective experiencing of an emotion, as well (see
Niedenthal et al., 2003, for a review).We have non-verbal
channels – facial expression, prosody, and body language –
to communicate emotions. So is there another reason for
using emotional words? How do emotional words convey
emotional meanings? What underlies the rapid2 vs. slow modes
of processing of emotional words? To answer these questions, it
is necessary to ﬁrst explore the purpose of using the language
system and its relationship with semantic memory, where
meanings and concepts, or knowledge about the world, are
represented in the mind. This understanding is fundamental
to an understanding of emotional words and concepts and
how these words are processed in the cerebral hemispheres.
Then we can describe the role that emotional words play in
human communication and the reason for the automatic vs.
attentional modes of processing of emotional words in the LH
and RH.
Accordingly, in the ﬁrst section of the paper, we present
two approaches – disembodied and embodied – to concept
representation and meaning access and then an integrative
approach that combines the capabilities of both. Next, the
linguistic and simulation (i.e., perceptual- or image-based)
systems, which are involved in conceptual processing and
meaning access, are presented. By the linguistic system here
we refer to the system for which linguistic forms3 are also
important; thus, meaning is mainly represented in the simulation
system (Barsalou et al., 2008). After that, we describe research
results that show how conceptual processing and meaning
access occur using the linguistic and simulation systems. Since
emotional words are generally more abstract, we will then
discuss the discriminating features of abstract and concrete
words. Then, we present evidence demonstrating that meaning
access during the early, automatic processing of emotional words
is superﬁcial and is accomplished by the linguistic system,
whereas meaning access during the later attentional processing
of emotional words is deep, and involves imagery and the
content of autobiographical memory. The paper will end with
a proposed framework that attributes the superﬁcial mode of
emotional word processing to the LH and the deep mode to
the RH.
2In this paper, we use automatic and rapid and also attentional and slow
interchangeably.
3A category of things distinguished by some common characteristic or
quality (www.oxforddictionaries.com). Indeed, language is divided into content
(meanings), form (i.e., rules, categories, structures), and use (pragmatics or the
social use of language).
Meaning Access and Conceptual
Processing
Semantic Memory and Approaches to Concept
(Meaning) Representation
We store knowledge we have acquired about the world, including
concepts, facts, skills, ideas, and beliefs, in a division of long-term
memory known as semantic memory (Glaser, 1992; Martin, 2001;
Thompson-Schill et al., 2006). Because concepts play important
roles in diﬀerent cognitive operations, semantic memory is
sometimes known as conceptual memory or the conceptual
system (e.g., Barsalou, 2003b). Unlike episodic memory, which
is a person’s unique memory of events and experiences (e.g.,
times, places), semantic memory consists of memories shared by
members of a culture (Tulving, 1972, 1984). For example, whereas
remembering the name and breed of our ﬁrst dog is dependent
on episodic memory, knowing the meaning of the word “dog”4
and what a dog is relies on semantic memory. Thus, studying
semantic memory and conceptual processing is a window that
guides us toward the way in which word meanings are accessed.
When we have a concept for something, it means that we know
its meaning. How is a concept stored in semantic memory?
What is the nature of the concepts or meanings stored in the
mind? Cognitive literature introduces two main approaches in
this respect: disembodied or symbolic (amodal) and embodied
(modal).
Disembodied Approach
The symbolic approach, which corresponds to the more
traditional view, assumes that there is no similarity between
components of experience – objects, settings, people, actions,
events, mental states, and relations – and concepts stored in
the mind. This approach proposes that perceptual –sensory,
motor, introspective (e.g., mental states, aﬀective, emotional5) –
information about components of experience is transduced (re-
described) into arbitrary (language-like) symbols such that the
ﬁnal concept contains no reference to the actual experience per se
(e.g., Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984; see Barsalou and Hale, 1993,
for review). Thus, abstract symbolic codes constitute concepts
and perceptual experiences do not play a role in knowledge
representation. Semantic networks which represent semantic
4Throughout this paper, when we talk about words vs. concepts, quotation marks
will be used to indicate words (e.g., “dog”) and uppercase will represent concepts
(e.g., DOG). Italics are used to introduce new key technical terms or labels.
5Although the terms emotion and aﬀect are mostly used interchangeably, it is
important not to confuse them. Aﬀects are composed of responses involving
respiratory system, blood ﬂow changes, facial expressions, vocalizations, and
viscera over which one has little control (Tomkins, 1995, p. 54). Aﬀects, indeed,
represent the way the body prepares itself for action in a given circumstances.
Feelings and emotions, in contrast, are personal, biographical, and social, in the
sense that every individual has his own set of sensations which are compared with
previous experiences. While aﬀects endow intensity to what we feel, feelings and
emotions help us interpret and recognize the quality (i.e., pleasant, unpleasant) of
our experiences and make our decision making activities more rational. Namely,
the experience of emotions is highly subjective (Citron, 2012; Citron et al., 2014).
For example, while we can speak broadly of certain emotions like anger, our own
experience of this emotion is unique and probablymulti-dimensional ranging from
mild annoyance to blinding rage. Therefore, the term emotion seems to better
explain subjective experiences that we refer to in this paper.
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relations between concepts constitute one example of this mode
of knowledge representation (Collins and Loftus, 1975; Posner
and Snyder, 1975).
Embodied Approach
The last two decades have witnessed a surge of interest in
alternative models of concept representation clustered under
the label embodied or modal approach (e.g., Barsalou, 1999;
Wilson, 2002; Gallese and Lakoﬀ, 2005; Glenberg, 2010). This
approach assumes that various sensory (visual, auditory, tactile,
etc.), motor, and introspective information about external world
experiences is depicted in the brain’s modality-speciﬁc systems.
Indeed, the claim that concepts are embodied means that they
are formed as a result of interactions with objects, individuals,
and the real world as a whole in modality-speciﬁc brain areas
that are responsible for processing the corresponding perceptual
information (Zwaan, 2004).
Thus, when an entity (e.g., object, event) is experienced, it
activates neurons in the sensory, motor, and aﬀective neural
systems. For example, when one sees a car, a group of neurons
ﬁres for color, others for shape, a third group for size, and
so forth, to represent CAR in one’s vision. Regarding the
auditory and tactile sensory modalities, analogous patterns of
activation can occur to represent how a car might sound or feel.
Moreover, activation of neurons in the motor system represents
actions on the car, and activations that occur in emotion-related
areas like the amygdala and orbitofrontal regions represent
emotional reactions toward the car (Barsalou, 1999, 2003a,
2008, 2009). So concepts have the same structure as perceptual
experiences.
Integrative Approach
The cognitive literature has recently appeared to provide support
for a middle approach to concept representation that combines
the two approaches described above (e.g., Vigliocco et al., 2004;
Barsalou et al., 2008; Louwerse, 2008, 2011; Simmons et al.,
2008; Louwerse and Hutchinson, 2012). Indeed, considering the
organization of the nervous system, it is hard to accept either the
pure disembodied or the pure embodied approach. The nervous
system has not only modality-speciﬁc (unimodal) areas but also
supramodal areas. This middle position proposes that concept
representation involves some form of symbolic information,
along with the activation of sensory, motor, and emotional areas
(e.g., Machery, 2007; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Meteyard
et al., 2012). To be speciﬁc, meaning is both grounded in
relation between words and in perceptual experiences (e.g.,
Vigliocco et al., 2004, 2009). There might, however, be important
diﬀerences; when meaning access is the product of relation
between words, it could be thought of as superﬁcial while
meaning access resulting from activating perceptual experiences
may be deeper, an idea we come back to later.
Binder and Desai (2011) suggest the term embodied
abstraction, which means that conceptual representation
consists of several levels of abstraction from sensory, motor, and
emotional input. The top level is highly abstract and activation in
this level is suﬃcient for familiar (already categorized) processes
such as lexical decision tasks (Glaser, 1992). Consequently,
processing does not involve activation of modality-speciﬁc areas.
In contrast, when a deep type of processing is necessary or
possible, such as when the exposure duration of words is long
(e.g., Simmons et al., 2008), perceptual areas play a greater role
in performing a task.
Based on this integrative approach, we can expect words to
ﬁrst create activation in supramodal areas that are not modality-
speciﬁc, in areas such as the anterior temporal lobe, which
has been described as the neural substrate behind semantic
memory (Simmons and Barsalou, 2003; Kiefer et al., 2007a,b;
Patterson et al., 2007; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Pulvermüller
et al., 2010). Activation in these areas is typically left-lateralized,
whereas bilateral activation can be expected when perceptual
areas come into play (e.g., Van Dam et al., 2010). This approach
likely implies two levels of processing: one level that is rather
superﬁcial and another level that is deep and during which
activation spreads to modality-speciﬁc areas (e.g., visual cortex,
auditory cortex, motor cortex). The main point here is that
word processing relies on both amodal and modality-speciﬁc
areas.
Two Systems Involved in Conceptual
Processing and Meaning Access
Most researchers working in the ﬁelds related to conceptual
processing accept that two systems – a language like system (i.e.,
linguistic system) and a perceptual- or image-based system
(i.e., simulation) – are involved in conceptual processing
(e.g., Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991; Glaser, 1992; Barsalou, 2008).
A detailed investigation of the role of these two systems is
found in Barsalou’s (2008) LASS theory – linguistic and situated
simulation. According to this theory, the linguistic system helps
us communicate the concepts that we have stored in our mind
and create a network containing semantically associated words.
This network encompasses categories of words and relations
among concepts.
Simulation or reenactment is the process by which concepts
re-evoke or produce perceptual states present when perceiving
and acting in the real world. In other words, our perceptual
system can become active in the absence of external world
entities. Researchers consider simulation to be the factor that
supports the spectrum of cognitive functions from perception
to thought and reasoning (Barsalou et al., 1999, 2003; Martin,
2001; Barsalou, 2003b). For example, being able to name the
diﬀerent colors of anAPPLE (red, yellow, green) is possible due to
simulation. Simulation is also considered to be situated (Barsalou,
2003b; Yeh and Barsalou, 2006). That is, during simulation not
only the target object (e.g., APPLE) is simulated, but also settings,
actions, and introspections. This triggers an experience of being
there. Thus, when an APPLE is simulated, it occurs in a setting
like a garden, with apples hanging from the branches of a tree,
with someone eating it, probably experiencing a pleasant taste.
As the Figure 1 illustrates, the LASS theory holds that when
a word is presented (heard or seen), both the linguistic and
simulation systems become active immediately to access its
meaning; however, the activation of the linguistic system peaks
before that of the simulation system. The reason is probably
that the linguistic forms of representation are more analogous to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 975
Abbassi et al. Emotional words embodied or disembodied?
FIGURE 1 | The LASS theory – linguistic and situated simulation: initial
contributions from the linguistic system (L) and the situated simulation
(SS) system during conceptual processing. When the cue is a word,
contribution from the linguistic system precedes those from the simulation
system. The height, width, shape, and offset of two distributions are not
assumed to be fixed. In response to different words in different task contexts,
all these parameters are expected to change (e.g., SS activity could be more
intense than L activity). Thus, the two distributions in this figure illustrate one of
infinitely many different forms that activations of the L and SS systems could
take. Figure and legend reproduced with permission from Barsalou et al.
(2008).
the perceived words than the simulation of related experiences.
Barsalou et al. (2008) claimed that, although the simulation
system existed long before human beings evolved, the use of
the linguistic system was what caused humans to enhance their
cognitive performance. It is as though the linguistic system
appeared later in human development in order to control the
simulation system and increase this system’s ability to represent
non-present situations.
Yet Barsalou et al. (2008) proposed that the activation of
the linguistic system is rather superﬁcial because meaning is
principally represented in the simulation system. For example,
“car” ﬁrst activates “vehicle” and “automobile” and then these
associated linguistic forms act like pointers to related conceptual
information. This process causes simulation to occur and
processing to become deep and deeper. Because the simulation
of related conceptual information proceeds more slowly than the
activation of associated words, the linguistic stage peaks earlier
than the simulation stage.
Research shows diﬀerent combinations of the activity of the
linguistic and simulation systems underlie a wide variety of
tasks. When a superﬁcial mode of processing is suﬃcient for
adequate task performance, processing is supported mostly by
the linguistic system and little by the simulation system. In
contrast, when the linguistic system cannot complete a task
on its own or there is opportunity (more time) for additional
processing, attention shifts to the simulation system which takes
extra time.
Evidence for Mixtures of Linguistic and Simulation
Systems in Conceptual Processing and Meaning
Access
The cognitive science literature provides evidence for a superﬁcial
mode of processing managed by the early acting linguistic system
and a deep mode of processing managed by the later-acting
simulation system. Two tasks have provided evidence for this
diﬀerence in depth of processing: the property veriﬁcation task
and the property generation task. We next describe the results of
research employing these two tasks, including one recent study
using event-related potentials (ERPs), to further understand the
nature of conceptual processing.
Evidence from the property verification task
A property veriﬁcation task (e.g., Solomon and Barsalou, 2001,
2004; Kan et al., 2003; Pecher et al., 2003; VanDantzig et al., 2008)
is a passive, recognition-oriented task, in which the participant
reads a concept word (e.g., an object name such as “chair”)
presented on a computer screen and veriﬁes whether the next
presented word is a true or false property of that concept (e.g.,
“facet” vs. “seat”). Response time and accuracy are measured.
Typically, the simulation system is expected to be involved in
responding to this task. That is because conceptual information
must be retrieved that identiﬁes whether the property is a
part of the concept. An interesting ﬁnding is that when the
property of a target trial (e.g., LEMON-“sour”) relates to a
diﬀerent modality than the previous trial (e.g., BLENDER-
“loud”), switching occurs between sensory modalities. This incurs
a processing cost: slower and less accurate responses (Pecher
et al., 2003) because attention must switch from one modality to
another.
Nevertheless, task condition may cause participants to mostly
rely on the linguistic system. That is, when information in
the linguistic system is suﬃcient, participants do not utilize
the simulation system (Solomon and Barsalou, 2004). On true
trials, the given property is always part of the concept (e.g.,
ELEPHANT-“tusk,” SAILBOAT-“mast”). Consequently, the type
of false properties presented is the factor that determines whether
the processing is superﬁcial or deep. On false trials, if the
given property is unrelated to the concept (e.g., AIRPLANE-
“cake,” BUS-“fruit”), the involvement of the linguistic system
is suﬃcient for adequate performance. That is because correct
responses in this condition are highly correlated with linguistic
associativeness; i.e., object and property being associated is equal
to a true response and being not associated is equal to a false
response. Thus, participants consult only the linguistic system
and processing is superﬁcial.
In contrast, when true trials (e.g., ELEPHANT-“tusk,”
SAILBOAT-“mast”) are mixed with false trials in which the
property is associated to the concept but is not a part
of its concept (e.g., TABLE-“furniture,” BANANA-“monkey”),
consulting the linguistic system is not suﬃcient. Consequently,
participants must simulate perceptual information for adequate
performance. Therefore, research shows participants are quite
faster (more than 100 ms) to verify the same true trials when
the false trials are unrelated than when they are related (Solomon
and Barsalou, 2004). This is evidence that the linguistic system
can act faster and produce responses earlier than the simulation
system.
Evidence from the property generation task
A property generation task (e.g., Wu and Barsalou, 2009; Santos
et al., 2011) is an active, production-oriented task, in which a
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word for a concept (e.g., “table”) is presented to the participant
who is asked to verbally generate its characteristic properties
(e.g., “legs,” “surface,” “eating on it”). This task is an important
tool in the psychology of concepts; it provides a window into
the underlying representation of a concept. The properties
that participants produce can reveal which system is involved
in meaning access. Since deep retrieval of a concept involves
simulation, experts in concepts believe that property generation
involves perceptual representation.
In a series of experiments, Santos et al. (2011) gave participants
words like “car,” “bee,” “throw,” and “good,” and asked for
the following word, that is, what other words came to mind
immediately. The words produced in a 5-s period (usually
1–3 words) were analyzed. Analysis of the responses showed
the linguistic origins of the various words produced such as
compounds (e.g., the response “hive” to “bee” comes from
“beehive”), synonyms (e.g., “automobile” in response to “car”),
antonyms (e.g., “bad” in response to “good”), root similarity
(e.g., “selﬁsh” in response to “self ”), and sound similarity (e.g.,
“dumpy” in response to “lumpy”).
In contrast, when participants were asked what characteristics
are typically true of (for instance) “dogs” and responses given
during a 15-s period were analyzed, most of the words produced
originated in the simulation system. In fact, the ﬁrst responses
were still linguistic-based, but they were followed by responses
originating in the simulation system. Thus, later responses
described aspects of situations such as physical properties (e.g.,
“wings” in response to “bee”), setting information (e.g., “ﬂowers”
in response to “bee”), andmental states (e.g., “boring” in response
to “golf”). Overall, the results suggest that both a faster-acting
linguistic system and a slower-acting simulation system are
involved in conceptual processing.
Similar ﬁndings were obtained when Simmons et al. (2008)
administered a property generation task in an MRI scanner. In
the ﬁrst session, participants generated the typical properties of
each concept to themselves for 15 s (property generation task),
and in the second session, they were given some other words and
generated word associates for each one for 5 s (word associate
task). In this session, for six presented words, participants were
given 15 s to imagine a situation that contained the related
concept [situated simulation (SS) task]. For example, for BEE
they might imagine a garden with a bee buzzing around ﬂowers
and then ﬂying toward a hive and so forth.
To analyze the data, each 15-s period of response time for
a single word was divided into two 7.5-s periods, an early one
and a later one. The results showed three regions of overlap
between the early stage of the property generation task and the
word association task: Broca’s area (the left inferior frontal gyrus),
left inferior temporal gyrus, and right cerebellum. These regions
are responsible for linguistic processing and generating two-
word associations (right cerebellum). A diﬀerent set of regions
overlapped between the later stage of the property generation
task and the SS task: bilateral posterior areas, precuneus, right
middle temporal gyrus, and right middle frontal gyrus. These
regions are involved in imagery, episodic memory, and situation
representation. Thus, fMRI research corroborates ﬁndings from
behavioral studies: properties bearing a linguistic relation to
presented words were produced earlier than properties bearing
a simulation relation.
Evidence from time course analysis
A recent ERP investigation conducted by Louwerse and
Hutchinson (2012) also suggests diﬀerent time course of
activation for linguistic and simulation processing, with evidence
that the linguistic system reaches its peak of activation earlier
that the simulation system. Half of the participants were assigned
to a semantic judgment task and the other half to an iconicity
judgment task. Each condition employed the same word pairs,
half with an iconic relationship in which the two words were
presented vertically in the same order that they appear in the
world (e.g., “sky” above “ground”) and the other half with
a reverse-iconic relationship (e.g., “ground” above “sky”). In
the semantic task, participants judged whether the words were
related in meaning; in the iconicity task, participants judged
whether the words appeared in the same conﬁguration as in the
real world (i.e., a yes/no response was required for both tasks).
The results showed the involvement of both linguistic and
simulation systems in responding to both tasks, with the
linguistic system being more active during the semantic task and
the simulation system during the iconicity task. Participants took
a mean 1809 ms to respond to task stimuli. Source analysis using
Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA)
showed that, for each trial, activation started (within 300 ms
after stimulus onset) around the left inferior frontal gyrus
(FC5, F7, T7) and then continued (within 1500–1800 ms after
stimulus onset) bilaterally in posterior areas of the brain (O1, O2,
P7, P8).
Overall, research ﬁndings suggest that, when words are
presented, two systems of linguistic and simulation come
into play immediately to access their meanings. However, the
activation in the linguistic system peaks early on; this type of
processing is rather superﬁcial and involves activation of a word’s
associates in the LH. In contrast, the activation in the simulation
system peaks later; this type of processing is deep and involves
SS of the referent of a word, for which bilateral activation may be
required.
Abstract vs. Concrete Word Processing
A key topic of discussion concerning word and concept
processing relates to abstract words. This is important because
abstract words, on average, tend to have more emotional
properties than concrete words (Kousta et al., 2011; Moseley
et al., 2012; Sakreida et al., 2013; see Meteyard et al., 2012,
for a review). Hence, we need to discuss the diﬀerentiating
characteristics of abstract words. Some concept experts (e.g.,
Paivio, 1971, 1986) claim that abstract concepts are represented
only through associations with other words, that is, through
the linguistic system. This notion may have been reinforced by
the results of neuroimaging research, which demonstrate more
activation of the LH during the processing of abstract words
compared to concrete words (see Sabsevitz et al., 2005, for a
review).
However, Barsalou (1999) casts doubt on this notion and
attributes this notion to the kind of task generally used to
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study abstract words. He believes that abstract words cannot
be learned without the contribution of SSs. In eﬀect, abstract
concepts are represented in a wide variety of situations featuring
predominantly introspective (emotional) and social information,
whereas concrete concepts are represented in a restricted range
of situations featuring chieﬂy sensory and motor information.
This diﬀerence causes the situation to play a critical role in deep
processing of abstract words. That is to say, both linguistic and
simulation systems are both involved in the processing of abstract
words; nevertheless, the type of task determines whether the
linguistic or simulation system is active.
In one study conducted by Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings
(2005) a property generation task was used to compare
representations of abstract concepts (e.g., TRUTH, FREEDOM,
INVENTION) and concrete concepts (e.g., BIRD, CAR, SOFA).
Simulation was shown to be also important in the representation
of abstract concepts. When participants were asked to generate
properties of concrete and abstract concepts, in both cases, they
produced relevant information about agents, objects, settings,
events, and mental states. However, the emphasis placed on
these diﬀerent types of information was diﬀerent. For concrete
concepts, the major focus was on information about objects and
settings. In contrast, for abstract concepts, more information
about mental states and events was produced.
As well, neuroimaging research demonstrates that abstract
concepts are represented by distributed neural patterns more
than concrete concepts (Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005;
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2012). Thus, for
an abstract word like “convince,” a variety of situations (e.g.,
a political situation, a sports situation, a school situation, etc.)
may come to mind to represent events in which one person
(agent) is speaking to another or others in order to change
their mind. It seems to be diﬃcult for people to process an
abstract word without bringing relevant situations into their
mind (Schwanenﬂugel, 1991). For a concrete word like “rolling,”
in contrast, the processing is simpler and more focused. Thus, the
role that a task plays is critical here: if the researcher was using
a lexical decision task, which typically encourages a superﬁcial
level of processing, there is more possibility that an abstract
word will access only the information provided by the linguistic
system (Glaser, 1992; Kan et al., 2003; Solomon and Barsalou,
2004). The involvement of the simulation system, on the other
hand, requires a task that encourages deep processing (Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2013).
This paper concerns emotional words, many of which are
abstract. So we can predict that the above descriptions of word
and concept processing, which show words can be processed
superﬁcially or deeply, will apply to emotional words and
concepts, as well. A review of the ﬁndings related to emotional
word processing should help verify this prediction.
Emotional Word Processing and
Meaning Access
In the second part of this paper we focus on emotional word
processing. We intend to show that, similarly to what we have
established thus far for neutral words, a superﬁcial type of
processing also occurs for emotional words. Although emotional
words possess emotional component, their processing does
not necessarily results in emotional states (e.g., Innes-Ker and
Niedenthal, 2002; Havas et al., 2007). That is, creating emotional
states and communicating emotional feelings may not be the only
or primary outcome of using emotional words. We have other
channels – prosody, facial expression, and body language – to
communicate our feelings. That is why some researchers believe
that language is a tool by which we can control our emotions (see
Niedenthal et al., 2003, for a review). The linguistic system, which
underlies superﬁcial word processing, likely leads to conveying
information about emotions without necessarily experiencing
emotional states. We suggest that the involvement of an image-
based system is necessary to experience emotional states as a
result of emotional word processing.
Thus we suggest that, similarly to what occurs for neutral
words, the involvement of a perceptual- or image-based system
is likely necessary for deep processing of emotional words. There
is, however, one important diﬀerence between deep processing
of neutral and emotional words. In deep processing of emotional
words, emotional properties6 likely have a crucial inﬂuence on
the outcome of the processing. This notion does not deny
the important role that perceptual (i.e., visual, auditory, etc.)
properties play in this process. As a result, we can imagine deep
processing of emotional words which may involve reactivation7
of emotional properties, to be able to create emotional states in
the individual (e.g., Havas et al., 2007). This does not mean that
deep processing is always along with reactivation of emotional
properties, but it keeps open diﬀerent possibilities for the
reactivation of emotional and perceptual properties: for example,
reactivation of only perceptual properties without emotional
properties, reactivation of one perceptual property (for instance,
visual) along with emotional properties, etc.
Therefore, the principal question in this part is: what
does happen when emotional words are presented? In the
following sections, after introducing emotional concepts, related
approaches, and an overview of the lateralization of emotional
word processing, we attempt to answer this question and ﬁnd the
reason for rapid vs. slow modes of processing of emotional words
in the cerebral hemispheres.
Emotional Concepts
Emotional concepts (e.g., FIGHT, SPIDER, JOY, ANGER)
represent knowledge about emotions, that is, the meaning of
emotional information. They hold information about behaviors
associated with emotions (e.g., actions), how emotions are elicited
6Properties or attributes perceived by emotional system. In general, emotional
properties are considered as part of perceptual properties (e.g., Barsalou, 1999).
Here, because the topic is directly related to a type of stimuli with emotional
component (emotional words), we bring emotional properties into our attention,
in order to be able to beter discuss their outcomes.
7Since simulation is mostly considered to be an automatic process and, as we
will see later on, deep processing of emotional words probably requires more
attentional components due to the role that imagery plays in this processing
(Pecher et al., 2009), we use the term reactivation as a substitute for simulation
for deep processing of emotional words. We wish to be suﬃciently cautious about
the automatic vs. attentional nature of simulation and imagery, respectively.
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(e.g., situations), and subjective experiences and bodily states that
occur when we are in an emotional state (Niedenthal, 2008).
Based on the information presented above, there should be
a link between emotional words and emotional concepts, i.e.,
emotional words should serve as a window to access emotional
concepts. Reactivating the emotional properties of emotional
concepts can be expected, in turn, to lead to subjective emotional
states.
Regarding the nature of emotional concepts, the literature
on emotion, perhaps under the inﬂuence of cognitive studies,
has adopted two approaches: disembodied or amodal and
embodied or modal. In the disembodied approach (Teasdale,
1999; Philippot and Schaefer, 2001), emotions are represented
in an amodal fashion, devoid of their perceptual and emotional
properties. Namely, emotional information that is initially
encoded in diﬀerent modalities (i.e., visual, auditory, etc.) is
represented and stored in the conceptual system separate from
its perceptual and emotional properties. Thus, just as people
know that CHAIR possesses the properties of seat, back, and legs,
they know that ANGER comprises the experience of frustration,
a desire to ﬁght, maybe a clenched ﬁst, and a rise in blood
pressure.
On the other hand, the embodied or modal approach proposes
that sensory, motor, and emotional states triggered during an
encounter with an emotion-evoking stimulus (e.g., a SNAKE) are
captured and stored in modality-speciﬁc brain areas (Damasio,
1989; Damasio and Damasio, 1994; Gallese, 2003; Niedenthal
et al., 2005a,b; Barrett, 2006). Later, during reactivation of the
experience (e.g., thinking about a snake), the original pattern
of sensory, motor, and emotional states can be relived. More
speciﬁcally, emotional states (e.g., feeling happy, sad, angry)
that are experienced during interaction with stimuli having
pleasant or unpleasant properties are stored and later reactivated.
Thus, like other concepts, processing of emotional concepts
is accompanied by reactivation of subjective experiences in
modality-speciﬁc areas in the brain (Chao and Martin, 2000;
Pecher et al., 2003; Vermeulen et al., 2007).
Similar to word and concept processing in general, the
literature provides evidence for rapid simultaneous activation of
the linguistic and emotional areas in the LH when emotional
words are presented (e.g., Herbert et al., 2011; Moseley et al.,
2012; Ponz et al., 2013; see Abbassi et al., 2011, for review), in
addition to a slower activation that occurs later on in the RH.
Our previous review (Abbassi et al., 2011) suggests that during
the automatic processing of emotional words, in tasks such as
lexical decision where deep processing is not required, early
ERP components like early posterior negativity (EPN)8 which
occur within 300 ms of stimulus onset, appear. For this type of
processing, in addition to language areas including the inferior
frontal (Broca’s area), inferior parietal, and superior temporal
(Wernicke’s area), limbic areas including the orbitofrontal,
prefrontal, amygdala, posterior cingulate, and insular cortex are
also activated.
8This negative potential occurs in posterior scalp regions, 200–300 ms after word
onset, for both negative and positive high-arousal words. It has been attributed
to the arousal feature of emotional words and appears predominantly in the left
occipitotemporal region (Kissler et al., 2007).
In contrast, when an explicit task like emotional Stroop task9 is
used, later ERP components like late positive component (LPC)
that occur more than 300 ms from stimulus onset, appear and
processing is stronger in the RH. This type of processing is slow,
requires attention, and also the involvement of some other areas
including anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Abbassi et al., 2011, for review). Accordingly, the same as neutral
word processing, it appears that emotional word processing
requires two systems: the linguistic system which peaks early
on and a second system, we will introduce it shortly, which
(like simulation) involves image reproduction, but with some
speciﬁcities relative to neutral words. The results of the relevant
research introducing the capabilities of these two systems follow.
Two Levels of Emotional Word Processing
Superficial Level
Research suggests that emotional word processing is not always
accompanied by feeling an emotion. Indeed, an emotional word
can be processed superﬁcially, such that no subjective experience
of emotion (emotional feeling) becomes involved. That is to say,
although emotional words possess emotional properties, their
processing does not necessarily lead to feeling an emotion.
One task that demonstrates this ﬁnding is the sentence
unscrambling task (e.g., Srull and Wyer, 1979; Bargh et al.,
1996; Innes-Ker and Niedenthal, 2002; Oosterwijk et al., 2010).
In this task, participants are presented with a series of words
in random order and asked to construct grammatically correct
sentences out of a subset of the words. Critical sentences are
intended to prime a speciﬁc pleasant or unpleasant concept (e.g.,
HAPPINESS, SADNESS). For example, in the study conducted
by Innes-Ker and Niedenthal (2002), 30 four-word sentences
that described behaviors, situations, and reactions associated with
happy or sad feelings were used. A ﬁfth word was added to
each sentence to create groups of ﬁve scrambled words. The
connotation of this word was the same as the sentence (e.g., “the
guest felt satisﬁed” as the sentence and “ease” as the ﬁller). Fifteen
sentences with neutral content were also added to each list to
control for the bias in favor of the intended emotional concept.
Participants were asked to construct a four-word sentence out of
each subset.
After performing the task, participants completed a self-report
measure of emotional state and also a lexical decision experiment.
The results indicated that unscrambling emotional sentences
did not aﬀect participants’ emotional state. Yet, performing
the task was eﬀective in priming semantically related words
having emotional component, because participants made faster
lexical decisions about words that were congruent with the
activated concept than about incongruent words (e.g., “joke”
primed “sunbeam,” not “speech”; “tears” primed “disease,” not
9The emotional Stroop task is a version of the standard Stroop task (Stroop, 1935)
in which participants are required to respond to the ink color of a color word while
ignoring its meaning (e.g., the word green written in red ink). Since reading is
an automatic process, naming the color in which a word is written requires the
allocation of attention and, hence, causes longer naming times (the Stroop eﬀect).
Similarly, in the emotional Stroop task, naming the color of an emotional word
takes longer than naming the color of a neutral word (the emotional Stroop eﬀect).
This eﬀect reﬂects the fact that attention is captured by the emotional content of
words (Williams et al., 1996).
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“breath”). Thus, participants could encounter emotional words
and construct sentences with an emotional meaning, but without
reactivating that meaning suﬃciently to trigger an emotional
subjective experience.
Here, we need to make a distinction between high-level
subjective emotional experience that we refer to in this paper
and low-level aﬀective or arousal changes that seem to occur
automatically early in processing (e.g., Kissler et al., 2007).
Although the sentence unscrambling task does not evoke
subjective emotional states, research shows it can evoke low-
level aﬀective changes in the body and face (Oosterwijk et al.,
2010). This type of (low-level) changes likely gives intensity to our
subjective experiences, i.e., what we feel later on5. Thus, following
Barsalou et al. (2008), we believe two systems (linguistic and
image-based) are activated when emotional words are presented.
The linguistic system, however, peaks before the image-based
system. That is, during superﬁcial processing of emotional words,
in addition to word forms (linguistic system), arousal features
are also accessed; these features likely potentiate subsequent
emotional feelings (Oosterwijk et al., 2010; Citron, 2012; Citron
et al., 2014).
So emotions are not necessarily experienced when we
encounter emotional words. That is probably because emotional
words are processed only superﬁcially at ﬁrst. In order to feel
an emotion, it appears that the brain areas responsible for
emotion must reactivate an emotional experience. Accordingly,
Niedenthal et al. (1994) suggested that emotional knowledge
is represented at three levels. The ﬁrst is the emotion lexicon
level, which includes words; this level is necessary for encoding
perceptual and emotional experiences. The second level is
the conceptual level, which contains memories of emotional
experiences. The third level is the somatic level; at this level,
feedback from the body is recognized and bodily changes
aﬀecting the autonomic nervous, endocrine, and muscular
systems are experienced10.
Therefore, reactivation of emotional states is likely a
prerequisite for subjective experiencing of an emotion; activation
of associated words does not lead to emotional feelings. If we
know that concepts are grounded not only in sensory and motor
experiences but also in emotional experiences, we can expect
reactivation of emotional experiences, similar to the reactivation
of sensory and motor experiences, to occur (Barsalou, 1999).
Deep Level
Evidence from the property verification task
Researchers working in areas related to emotion have used the
property veriﬁcation task to show that the emotional properties of
concepts can be reactivated using the same system that supports
emotional responses to an object or event. For example, in
Vermeulen et al.’s (2007) study, not only perceptual (e.g., visual,
auditory) but also emotional (pleasant and unpleasant) properties
of concepts were taken into consideration. Half of the trials
were constructed of concepts paired with properties coming from
the same modality as in the previous trial (e.g., TRIUMPH-
“exhilarating”/COUPLE-“happy”) and the other half of concepts
10Only the ﬁrst two levels seem to be relevant to the topic of this paper.
paired with properties coming from diﬀerent modalities than in
the previous trial (e.g., FRIEND-“tender”/TREASURE-“bright”).
In such a task, verifying, for instance, that TRIUMPH can be
“exhilarating” or a COUPLE can be “happy” involves reactivating
emotional properties in the emotional system whereas verifying
that a FRIEND can be “tender” after verifying that a TREASURE
can be “bright” reactivate two diﬀerent systems (the emotional
system for the former and the visual system for the later).
Thus, similar to the switching cost for neutral pairs that we
reviewed earlier (e.g., Pecher et al., 2003), the results showed
slower reaction times and higher error rates when judgments
required participants to switch modalities, that is, when trials
with emotional properties were preceded by trials with perceptual
properties. This ﬁnding suggests that, in order to verify an
emotional property, this property needs to be reactivated by the
emotional system.
Evidence from the property generation task
Property generation tasks have yielded the same conclusion as
property veriﬁcation tasks. Since emotional words are more
abstract, we would expect participants to generate and focus
on situations, events and introspective (including emotional)
properties when a property generation task is used (Martin and
Chao, 2001). Accordingly, when Oosterwijk et al. (2009) asked
participants to generate properties of the emotional words “pride”
and “disappointment,” most of the generated words described
situations, personal attributions, events, and associated reactions
rather than agents and objects.
For “pride,” words or phrases like “school,” “sport,” “good
marks,” “winning a game,” “did well,” “applause,” “throwing a
party,” “feeling happy,” and “signiﬁcant others (parents, friends,
family)” were produced. Likewise, for “disappointment,” words
or phrases like “doing badly,” “losing,” “failing psychophysiology,”
“getting an F,” “exams,” “driving test,” “shame,” “fear,” “feeling
angry,” and “depression” were generated. As indicated, almost
all the words generated referred to situations, actions, and
introspective states, and many referred directly to emotional
states. Producing words or phrases like “feeling happy” even
suggests the possibility that the participant may experience an
emotion (Barsalou, 1999).
One point that merits special attention and seems to be
indicated by the results is the likely activation of autobiographical
memory when emotional words are processed. Here, we need
to consider the diﬀerentiating feature of autobiographical
memory and episodic memory. In fact, some researchers treat
autobiographical and episodic memory as synonyms, but others
believe they should be treated separately (e.g., Tulving, 1983;
Conway, 1990; Cabeza et al., 2004; McDermott et al., 2009; see
Marsh and Roediger, 2012, for a review). They say that memory
for events with speciﬁc times and places should be referred
to as episodic memory, whereas autobiographical memory is
related to our personal history in which priorities are given to
emotional properties, not to speciﬁc times and places: memories,
for instance, of our ﬁrst-grade experiences, of learning to drive a
car, of friends we had in university, or of grandparents. Conway
(1990) argues that autobiographical memory plays a pivotal role
in the representation of emotional information.
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In the next section, we discuss autobiographical memory
which seems to provide the content for imagery11 system
and whose role in emotional word processing is likely
comparable with semantic memory which provides content for
the simulation system. While literature suggests that semantic
memory is likely centered in the LH, the concentration
of autobiographical memory seems to be in the RH (see
Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000, for a review). We suggest this
system is crucially involved in deeper processing of emotional
words.
Imagery, Autobiographical Memory, and
the RH
As mentioned above, reactivation (simulation) of stored
information appears to be necessary for deep processing of
word stimuli. We also know that a slow type of processing
for which attention is necessary and which is concentrated
in the RH probably occurs for emotional words (Abbassi
et al., 2011, for review). So, the question here is: what is the
factor that is comparable to simulation, i.e., involves image
reproduction, and for which the RH plays a critical role?
According to literature, imagery has all these features (Holmes
and Mathews, 2005, 2010; Holmes et al., 2008). Imagery is, in
fact, a process that creates a mental image for the individual
using diﬀerent senses. Thus, it allows one to see, hear, smell, and
feel diﬀerent components of a situation (i.e., people, settings,
actions, . . .) (Kosslyn et al., 2006). A distinguishing feature of
emotional word processing is that image-based processing, in
addition to including perceptual information, likely involves
reactivated emotional properties based on the involvement of
autobiographical memory. (see Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000, for a
review). The suggestion is that autobiographical memory plays
a pivotal role in the representation of emotional information
(Conway, 1990).
In fact, the relationship between imagery and emotion is
mediated by autobiographical memory. That is to say, a link
between imagery and autobiographical memory is responsible
for the emotional outcomes of image use. Holmes et al. (2008)
attribute the more powerful impact of imagery on emotion, as
compared to words, to three possible reasons: (1) the emotion
system existed long before the language system12; (2) images
share perceptual properties and details with actual experiences
(Kosslyn et al., 2001); and (3) autobiographical memories,
including emotional states experienced during interactions with
the real world, are ﬁrst stored in the form of images, not
language. Images are therefore likely to be eﬀective cues for
11Concept experts always compare simulation with imagery. While simulation is
essentially an automatic process, attention is involved in imagery (Pecher et al.,
2009). This conclusion is based on the results of research comparing these two
processes (e.g., Wu and Barsalou, 2009). Participants in the imagery group were
explicitly asked to form an image of a concept when responding to task items,
while participants in the control group were required only to think about that
concept and were not instructed to form an image. The claim that simulation
occurs automatically arises from the results shown by the control group in this
research, which presented similar results to the imagery group, implying that the
control group also used imagery to respond.
12Recall that Barsalou et al. (2008) also claimed that the simulation system evolved
before the language system in human beings.
reactivating emotional experiences. To be precise, imagery has a
stronger emotional impact than purely linguistic forms because
it has privileged access to the emotional experiences stored in
autobiographical memory.
Research even suggests a causal relationship between imagery
and emotion (Holmes et al., 2008); this implies that a more
direct link exists between imagery and emotions, than between
words and emotions. In this research, participants are given
a combination of pictures and words conveying an emotional
meaning (e.g., a picture of a ﬂight of stairs and the word
fall written beneath) and asked to rate their contents, without
receiving any instructions concerning which modality to use.
Results show that participants base their responses primarily on
pictures, not words. Moreover, the more participants use images
to respond, the more likely they are to report experiencing an
emotional state.
Taking lateralization into consideration, the distinguishing
feature of emotional word processing, i.e., imagery and the
contribution of autobiographical memory should be responsible
for the role that the RH play in this processing. Since the
center of autobiographical memory retrieval is likely located in
the RH (Tulving et al., 1994; Nyberg et al., 1996; Perecman,
2012; see Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000, for a review) and based
on the aforementioned points, we can propose that the
salient role of the RH in emotional word processing may
relate to the retrieval of the contents of autobiographical
memory surrounding past events and personal histories, which
feeds imagery of emotional words. Pinpointing the role of
the corpus callosum might also highlight the RH’s role in
this process. Indeed, research shows that individuals with
congenital absence of the corpus callosum produce language
that contains almost no words denoting emotions (Turk et al.,
2010). This deﬁcit presumably causes the LH, which also
has the role of generating language units such as words,
to have reduced access to autobiographical memory contents
in the RH. This deﬁcit, which is called as alexithymia, has
also been reported in patients with surgical disconnection of
the cerebral hemispheres (Tenhouten et al., 1985a,b,c). Thus,
there seems to be robust evidence supporting the salient
role of the RH in deep processing of emotional words in
which perceptual and emotional properties are involved, which
coincides with an important role of the RH in autobiographical
memory.
The Suggested Framework: How Does
Superficial vs. Deep Processing Occur?
One outcome of the above-mentioned superﬁcial vs. deep
processing types is that when we encounter an emotional word,
we might access its semantically associated words, but not
its perceptual and emotional properties. Following Barsalou
et al. (2008), we believe that emotional words ﬁrst access only
semantically associated words, and that this process is focused
mainly in the LH.When this process involvesmental imagery and
access to autobiographical memory contents, deeper processing
occurs. This type of processing presumably occurs mainly in the
RH and may be followed by experiencing a subjective emotional
state.
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For example, a word like “ﬂower” might activate words like
“rose,” “beautiful,” “fragrance,” and “branch.” When processing
becomes deep due to, for instance, employing an explicit task
or longer exposure duration of stimuli, the activated words
lead to the recall of contents in autobiographical memory in
which FLOWER can be found: this involves imagery. Therefore,
depending on the individual’s memory content, a situation
containing concepts like GARDEN, SPRING, PARK,WALKING,
and NICEWEATHERmay become active and the individual may
see himself walking in a garden full of ﬂowers in the spring, with
nice weather, and ﬁnally perhaps feeling a pleasant emotional
state.
On the unpleasant side, a word like “cancer” may activate
words like “fear,” “bad,” “pain,” “disease,” and “death.” When
processing becomes deeper, depending on the individual’s
memory contents, a situation containing concepts like
CHEMOTHERAPY, HOSPITAL, SURGERY, and FIGHTmay be
activated and the individual may see himself in a hospital room
with a patient battling cancer and be left feeling an unpleasant
emotional state. Obviously, not such an elaborated scenario is
necessary or occurs all the time. So what may occur can be
reactivation of only perceptual properties without emotional
properties, or reactivation of emotional properties along with
part of perceptual properties, etc.
Creating an emotional state, then, requires that
autobiographical memory contents be activated and,
consequently, that the emotional properties of an emotional
concept are experienced; this is not possible unless imagery is
involved. That is, activating semantically associated words and a
superﬁcial mode of processing does not lead to the experience of
an emotional state per se. As well, activating perceptual properties
does not create emotional feelings.
In sum, when emotional words are presented, the two systems
of linguistic and imagery can become active. However, the
linguistic system for which the LH is dominant seemingly
operates automatically and, thus, peaks before the imagery
system. As a result of this process emotional words likely establish
a link with semantically associated words. When this superﬁcial
mode of processing is suﬃcient for adequate task performance,
processing is supported mostly by the linguistic system and does
not involve emotional feelings.
In contrast, when the linguistic system cannot complete a task
on its own, or when there is more time to process emotional
words, the imagery system may become involved. In this type
of processing, the retrieval of past memories and situations
containing these concepts occurs. This processing is deep and
may be followed with subjective experiencing of an emotional
state. We do not claim that processing in the RH always triggers
an emotional state, but the level of processing in the RH should
be deeper than in the LH and involves imagery. This latter stage,
for which the RH is likely more responsible than the LH, is slow
because more components (i.e., reactivation of perceptual and
emotional properties) are involved.
Conclusion
This paper investigates emotional words and the reason for
fast vs. slow processing of these words, which occurs mainly in
the LH and RH, respectively. Although we can use emotional
words to convey emotional feelings, experiencing emotions
may not be the primary outcome of using emotional words.
This review suggests two systems of the linguistic and image-
based (imagery) are involved in the processing of emotional
words. As long as the processing involves mainly the linguistic
system, emotional word processing does not necessarily result in
emotional states.
Further research should be carried out using emotional
words and tasks pinpointing a superﬁcial vs. deep level of
processing. Taking into consideration the few studies that have
examined these two levels, using tasks such as word veriﬁcation
and word generation tasks should be helpful in revealing
further aspects of this process. In addition, by using short vs.
long exposure durations or tasks targeting superﬁcial vs. deep
processing, emotional word processing can be compared in the
two hemispheres.
Thus, the level of emotional word processing in the RH should
be deeper than in the LH and, thus, it is conceivable that the slow
mode of processing in the RH adds certain qualities (reactivating
perceptual and emotional properties) to the output.
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